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This sounds much like the type of predisposition discussed in Marshall:

"The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and

criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central

concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the

promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process. See

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 259-262, 266-267 (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to

guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted

conception of the facts or the law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976). At the same

time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important

to a popular government, that justice has been done,' Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341

U. S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his

interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the

arbiter is not predisposed to find against him." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).

Keep us posted.

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